Abstract. We introduce a general objective function, which incorporates competitive situations, such as conservative, punitive, and predatory advertising. Linking together the particular situations into a twoparameter family of max-min problems, and using the Lanchester model to describe the dynamics of the market, a bilinear-quadratic differential game is obtained. For this game, we find saddle-point feedback time-invariant advertising strategies and show when these strategies are Nash equilibrium strategies. In an empirical application involving duopolistic competition in the cola market, we find evidence of a punitive motivation for the advertising strategies.
Introduction
Profit maximization is the objective assumed almost always in the modeling of marketing strategies in competitive situations; e.g. see the survey in Ref. 1 . That is, it is assumed usually that marketing competitors wish to maximize either the current or discounted profit in developing their 1 marketing-mix strategies. There are studies that allow for other objectives: Ref. 2 assumes a weighted combination of profit and revenue in a duopolistic price game, and Ref. 3 considers a performance index that combines the discounted profit and terminal market share in a duopolistic differential game advertising model. The large majority of studies of marketing competition assume profit maximization even though other objectives are possible. Also, empirical evidence is lacking to support profit maximization as the objectives of competing firms. In fact, the existing limited empirical research (Ref. 4 ) rejects the hypothesis of profit maximization for oligopolistic firms.
We need to consider more seriously what motivates competitors involved in oligopolistic situations, in which the competitors, their actions, and their outcomes are all interdependent. Especially when decision makers attempt to incorporate long-term considerations, they may use surrogate measures of long-term profitability or try to manage the risk involved in long-term results. The strategic market management literature (e.g. Refs. 5-7) emphasizes the importance of competitive positioning through differentiation or low cost to gain competitive advantage. More directly related to the motivations of oligopolistic rivals, Ref. 8 suggests four different orientations that competing rivals could adopt:
(i) ''One-on-One Combat'', in which the rivals aspire to win by beating their opponents and by outscoring their opponents in terms of customers, sales, or profits; (ii) ''I Do the Best I Can,'' under which the competitors do not concentrate on each other, but try to profit by focusing on the customer needs; (iii) ''We Are All in the Same Boat'', where competitors attempt to collude; (iv) ''Competition without Competition'', through which competitors try to avoid direct competition by focusing on different pockets in the market.
These general orientations seem plausible, as may others. We know little about what particular orientations or objectives competitors might adopt in oligopolistic situations. The present study adopts a dynamic duopoly setting to consider the issue of different competitive advertising objectives. Advertising is often used in competitive situations to deal with rival challenges and maintain market and profit success. A notable example is the cola war involving Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola (Ref. 9) . To model such a situation, we consider a performance index which is a linear combination of the profits of both the firms in a duopoly. The optimal strategy that results will be a max-min strategy of a stressed profit, rather than a profit-maximizing strategy. The max-min strategy is the best response to the worst-case rival threat. The extent to which profit is stressed in the performance index depends on the optimism of the manager. An optimistic manager will want to protect the entire profit (unstressed profit), and a pessimistic manager will want to protect a smaller part of the profit (stressed profit). We refer to a manager whose goal is to protect profit as a conservative manager.
Extending the performance index described above to a general objective function, which also depends on two parameters, we are able to explain different managerial objectives. Using the well-known Lanchester model to describe the dynamics of the market, we obtain a bilinear-quadratic differential game. For this game, we find a two-parameter family of maxmin strategies which are subgame perfect. We show when the max-min forms a Nash equilibrium strategy.
We conduct also an empirical investigation that involves the estimation of a simultaneous system of equations derived from a dynamic demand model and the feedback advertising strategies of the duopolistic rivals. We use the data from the cola market to examine the competitive objectives used by the rival brands Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. Evidence of a punitive motivation for advertising investments is found.
The results described above are shown in the framework of the model described in the following section.
Model
We use the parsimonious Lanchester model to capture the dynamics of the market share evolution in a duopoly setting. With this model, we assume that two firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) are competing in a duoply market for a fixed pool of customers. Let x(t) be the fraction of the total customer pool that purchases the product from Firm 1 at time t. Then, 1Ax(t) is the fraction of customers buying the product from Firm 2 at time t. The marketing efforts (as advertising) of Firm 1 are directed to attract the customers of Firm 2. These efforts are confronted by the opposite activity of Firm 2. We measure the advertising effort, at time t, of firm k, kG1, 2, bu u k (t) and its effectiveness by the constant ρ k . The change in x(t) is assumed given by the kinematics equation (Ref. 10) known as Lancaster model
In the language of dynamic systems, x(t) is a state variable and u 1 (t), u 2 (t) are the control variables. The Lanchester model (1) has been used in numerous studies; see e.g. Ref. 3 and Refs. 10-20. The model has been used to analyze competitive advertising strategies for maximizing profits, more exactly, in finding Nash equilibrium strategies for the differential game associated with Eq. (1) and the discounted profit functions
where
The constant q k represents the firm k's gross profit rate and µH0 is the common discount rate. Profit maximization, as an advertising objective, is only one possibility. Below, we outline three others.
Conservative Advertising. We consider a situation in which the manager of the firm, Firm 1 for example, wants to develop an advertising strategy to protect the firm profit from its rival aggressive advertising. To model such a situation, we consider a performance index, which is a linear combination of the profits of both firms. In this way, the manager can influence both the own investment and the rival advertising investment. Let J be the performance index. Then,
where Π k , kG1, 2, is as in (2) . The parameter θ measures the manager sensitivity to the rival threat. As the value of θ moves to the right toward −1, the manager is more sensitive to the rival threat. The value θG−S corresponds to the other extreme, the manager who is not sensitive to the rival aggressive advertising, and wishes to protect the firm entire profit. We refer to a manager whose goal is to protect the firm profit from rival threats as a conservative manager and the advertising strategy used by him to protect the firm profit will be termed conservative advertising. In the range −SFθF−1, the manager is more conservative when θ is close to −1 and less conservative when θ approaches −S. The optimal strategy of the conservative manager is a max-min strategy. Such a strategy is the best advertising response to the worst-case rival advertising. Formally, the best strategy u* 1 for the worst-case rival strategy u* 2 has to satisfy
Any pair (u* 1 , u* 2 ) that satisfies the above inequalities is called a game-theoretic saddle-point (Ref. 21 ) and is a max-min strategy of the above game. Note that the convexity of J with respect to u 2 follows from the fact that θ is negative. The kind of performance index represented in (3) was considered first in control theory for systems subject to uncertainties and disturbances (Refs. [22] [23] . Reference 23 used the name ''total stress'' for an objective function similar to (3) . Here, we consider the deterministic parallel, where ''stress'' is the profit lost due to the rival aggressive actions.
Punitive Advertising. Now, consider a situation when the firm goal is to discourage its competitor by attempting to attenuate its profits. This is the case when the firm tries to force its competitor out of the market. We will refer to such a manager as a punitive manager. What should be the advertising investment of a punitive manager? In the following, we address this question.
Let Π k , kG1, 2, be as in (2) . Then, the problem of the punitive manager is to find the best strategy u* 1 , such that,
where −θ −1 is the lower bound of the desired ratio of the corresponding profits. Here, θ measures how punitive the manager is. As this parameter moves toward the value 0, the manager is more punitive, and inversely as it moves toward −1 the manager is less punitive. To solve this problem, it is enough to find u* 1 such that
Let J be as in (3) . Then, a max-min strategy (u* 1 , u* 2 ) as in (4) will satisfy Π 1 (u* 1 )Cθ
for any u 2 . Therefore, for satisfying (5b), it is sufficient that
In other words, this problem is derived from the problem of finding max-min strategies (more exactly, saddle-point strategies) for the differential game associated with the objective function JGΠ 1 Cθ Predatory Advertising. This is a specal case of punitive advertising for θG−1. As we will show in the sequel, if both competitors have the same punitive objectives, they play a zero-sum game and the result is that one firm wins and the other goes bankrupt. This strategy is parallel to the case of the well-known predatory pricing; therefore, we refer to this special case as predatory advertising.
In the control theory literature, the punitive advertising and predatory advertising problems give rise to the disturbance attenuation problem (Ref. 25 ).
All the above problems, are derived from the differential game associated with (1) and the objective function
with the parameters qH0 and θF0. Therefore, for certain values of q and θ, the max-min (saddle-point) strategies of the differential game associated with (7) and (1), form the required strategies for the problems raised above. Strategies for the conservative, punitive, and predatory advertising are obtained if we set qGq 1 Aθ −1 q 2 and vary θ in the range −SFθF−1 for conservative advertising and in the range −1⁄θF0 for punitive advertising; at the boundary θG−1, we have the special case of predatory advertising. All these results are outlined in Table 1 . 
The saddle-point strategies for the general game introduced above are derived next.
Saddle-Point Strategies
Consider the time-variant bilinear-quadratic game problem associated with (1) and (7) . We want to find admissible controls u* 1 and u* 2 satisfying the saddle-point condition (4) . A control function u k , kG1, 2, is an admissible control if it is a bounded and nonnegative function in [0, S), which is a state feedback. For such controls, (1) reveals that 0 ⁄x⁄1. G2µ f (x)A2, µH0.
Let x 0 be a point in I. If
For proof, see the Appendix, Section 7.
Considering Lemma 3.1, we have the following result.
where x and f (x) are as in Lemma 3.1. Then, (u* 1 , u* 2 ) are saddle-point feedback time-invariant strategies of the differential game associated with (7) and (1).
For proof, see the Appendix, Section 7. In the following, we show for which games and for which values of θ and q the above saddle-point strategies become Nash equilibrium feedback strategies.
Firms with Similar Objectives
Let Π 1 and Π 2 be as in (2) , and consider two cases:
Then, the following results hold. Proof. Part (ii) is trivial. To see Part (i), we apply Theorem 3.1 once to J 1 and once to J 2 . ᮀ Part (ii) of Theorem 4.2 highlights why we identify the special case θG −1 of punitive advertising as predatory advertising.
Empirical Application
We use advertising and market-share data for the two cola soft-drink brands Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola to investigate the objectives used to set the advertising levels for the two brands. This cola rivalry has been investigated in other studies (Refs. [18] [19] [20] , but all these previous studies assume profit maximization and do not examine the objectives of the competitors.
From (10), we have the following relationship involving the advertising strategies of the two cola competitors:
Equation (11) together with a discrete-time version of the market share equation (1) form a simultaneous system of nonlinear equations. Coca-Cola is assumed to be competitor 1, and x is Coca-Cola's market share. Full-information maximum likelihood, the asymptotically efficient estimation method for simultaneous models, is used to estimate the system (1), (11) . Advertising and market share data from the period 1968-84 are used in the estimation. Note that Coca-Cola created a market disruption in 1985 by introducing New Coke, so the data after 1984 are not used. The estimates of the parameters θ, ρ 1 , ρ 2 are shown in Table 2 . In particular, the estimate of θ can be compared to the values in Table  1 that this parameter must take for one of the three advertising problems (conservative, punitive, or predatory) to hold. The estimate of θ from Table  2 , −0.7415, is between zero and minus one. Further, the estimate is different significantly from minus one (at the 0.05 level), so that we have clear evidence of punitive advertising in the cola market.
Conclusions
The present study of advertising competition provides theoretical and empirical contributions. The theoretical contributions include: (i) the modeling of a general objective function that can incorporate various motivation scenarios; (ii) the finding of subgame perfect feedback equilibrium strategies of the general model. Empirically, we provide evidence for a punitive motivation for competitive advertising strategies.
The results developed here have interesting implications. We show when the max-min (saddle-point) is a Nash equilibrium strategy. Furthermore, in the particular case of predatory advertising, the competitors play a zero-sum game; therefore, one firm wins and the other goes bankrupt.
To be sure, the study has limitations. We consider only certain advertising situations: those that are consistent with our general objective function. A challenge for future research is to extend the research to a wider domain. We hope to stimulate further research in the area of alternative objectives in competitive markets.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Equation (8a) can be written as
Considering (8b) and (12) (13) (14) , we have
Given (15), there is a neighborhood of x 0 in I such that, for each x in this neighborhood, Y′(x)H0. We claim that
therefore,
Assume to the contrary that there is a point
] such that Y′(x 1 )G0, and let x 1 be the minimal point in [x 0 , x ) (or correspondingly the maximal point in (x , x 0 ]) with this property. Since
and similarly,
considering (12)- (14) and (8b), we obtain
which is a contradiction.
Consider (12)- (14) and (16); from the fact that
we obtain 
where F(x) is given by
F(x 0 )G{qx 0 C(1͞4)[ρ 
In the following, we want to prove that the strategies in (10) 
with the boundary condition
where the corresponding strategies of the players are
Let F(x) be the same as in (19)- (21) . We want to prove that the Isaacs equation admits a solution
V(x, t)GqF(x).
From (25), we obtain
Considering (26) and comparing (24) with (10), it is easy to see that, if we prove that (25) satisfies (22) (27) which is exactly (19) . ᮀ
